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AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO RESTORE JUSTICE
GEORGE SUTHERLAND'S TARNISHED REPUTATION: A
REVIEW ESSAY
Gary C. Leedes*
I. SUCCESS AND MODERATION
Justice George Sutherland (1862-1942) is the subject and
hero of Professor Hadley Arkes's laudatory new biography.1
Arkes portrays Sutherland as a judge "who had found the
ground of [his] jurisprudence in 'natural rights."2 Although
history has not treated the Justice kindly, Arkes attempts to
reverse history's verdict.
Sutherland was an intelligent jurist who agreed with the
following classical liberal assertions:
(1) individuals own their bodies and minds and, by extension,
they own the products of their work: property and income;
(2) a nation's prosperity in the long run will be enhanced if
individuals are free to acquire as much wealth as they can
honestly get;
(3) freedom of contract, a fundamental right, should not be
restricted by lawmakers who cannot possibly know or take into
account each economic actor's preferences, needs, and unique
circumstances;
(4) the government's primary role is to protect the nation
from foreign and domestic enemies, and to secure each
individual's autonomy and property against nuisances, torts and
common law crimes.
* Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond;
B.S.E., 1960, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1962, Temple Law School; LL.M.,
1973, Harvard Law School; S.J.D., 1984, Harvard Law School. I thank Professor Greg
Sergienko and Jeff Millican for helpful comments that improved an earlier draft.
1. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994).
2. Id. at ix.
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Sutherland believed that the common weal is served best if
the Court provides individuals with maximum protection
against the government's power.3 His beliefs were embodied in
several opinions he wrote as a Supreme Court Justice. For
example, he wrote:
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by
the Constitution is not to strike down the common good, but
to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot
be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary
restraint of the liberties of its constituent members.4
Sutherland's convictions should not be viewed as mere per-
sonal predilections according to Professor Arkes, who suggests
that Sutherland understood the Constitution's provisions in
light of extra-textual "'natural rights' [that are] bound up with
certain 'self-evident' moral 'truths.'
5
I am not convinced that Sutherland had access to immutable
moral truth, but he did have definite ideas about good govern-
ment and he communicated his ideas with precision and clarity.
He brought to the Court's "deliberations learning and dialectical
skill, a wide knowledge of affairs enriched by varied and emi-
nent public service, and a habit of thoroughness. . . ."s For
most of his career, he was both principled and judicious. Before
he retired, however, he became dogmatic and injudicious, and
he was accordingly criticized.
When the Great Depression arrived in the 1930s, Sutherland
was known to be a Justice who wanted to take the nation back
to the horse and buggy days. In fact, he was born in England
during the horse and buggy era. He arrived in the United
States in 1864 when he was about eighteen months old, when
his father, then a Mormon, migrated to Utah. Years later,
3. In an earlier biography, Sutherland has been accurately described as a "Man
Against the State." See generally JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND:
A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 239 (1951). In many ways, I found Paschal's biography
more balanced, better written and more informative than Arkes's apologia for
Sutherland.
4. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
5. ARKES, supra note 1, at 9.
6. 303 U.S. vi (1938) (Letter from Justice Sutherland's colleagues on the Court
following their notification of his retirement).
816 [Vol. 30:815
A REVIEW ESSAY
Sutherland commented that he was tempted to think of himself
as a "pioneer."'
Sutherland attended Brigham Young University, an institu-
tion that distributed Mormon texts advancing the idea that the
Constitution was divinely inspired.8 Although Sutherland was
not a Mormon, his psyche was indelibly influenced by Utah's
religious environment. It shaped his view that human beings
sui juris are moral agents with free will and the capacity to
govern themselves largely without help from or supervision by
the government. As an adult, Sutherland consistently adhered
to the so-called Protestant work ethic, and he used his high
office to proclaim that Americans were "a Christian people."9
Sutherland attended the University of Michigan Law School
for one term in 1882. On the faculty teaching constitutional law
were Judges Thomas M. Cooley and James V. Campbell, both of
whom believed that a censorial judiciary is necessary because
the Constitution's limitations on lawmakers are not self-execut-
ing and because officials who enact and enforce laws often ex-
ceed their department's limited powers."
Sutherland returned to Utah in 1883 to practice law. He
became a successful attorney, a popular public speaker, and he
served in the Utah Senate from 1896 to 1900." During this
period, he actively supported the enactment of a law limiting
the maximum number of hours employees could work in under-
ground mines. Sutherland's individualism was moderated by the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (roughly, use your
own property without causing injury to others).
During his legislative career, Sutherland occasionally was
willing to permit the government to interfere with free trade.
For example, when he served in the United States House of
Representatives from 1901 to 1903, Sutherland fought to obtain
a tariff to protect Utah's sugar crop.' He defended his protec-
tionism by arguing that tariffs "make production profitable
7. PASCHAL, supra note 3, at 4.
8. Id. at 5-6.
9. United States v. Maclntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
10. PASCHAL, supra note 3, at 15-16.
11. Id at 20-37.
12. Id. at 41.
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thereby creating a demand for labor."" Sutherland dipped into
the pork barrel to obtain direct federal financial aid for the
construction of reservoirs in Utah.' He also obtained federal
money in the form of a bounty for Utah's sugar producers.
During this period, he was not yet fanatically opposed to pater-
nalism.
As a United States Senator from 1905 to 1917, Sutherland
yielded, with some misgiving, to several of the Progressive
movement's demands. For example, he supported the Pure Food
and Drugs Act,'5 the Seaman's Act of 1915,16 the Federal
Employers' Liability Act" (a strict liability workmens' compen-
sation statute for some employees engaged in interstate com-
merce), and legislation establishing the Children's Bureau. 8
During this period of his career, he was aiming for an eventual
appointment to the Supreme Court and, perhaps, as one of his
biographers speculated, he was attempting to allay the fears of
influential people who believed that he was incapable of inter-
preting the Constitution impartially. 9  In any event,
Sutherland attempted to find "a middle way" that reconciled his
preferences for a limited government with the "popular aspira-
tions of the period.""0
In 1915, he introduced the woman's suffrage amendment to
the Constitution. His strong support for women's suffrage and
gender equality was based on sincerely held moral convictions.
During Sutherland's two terms in the Senate, he was a major
contributor to reforms improving the administration of justice.
He was an active member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
His experience on the committee eventually led him to conclude
that the President has inherent powers. His conception that the
13. Id. at 82.
14. Id. at 41-44.
15. Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
16. Seaman's Act, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22, 33, & 46 U.S.C.).
17. Employers' Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
18. Children's Bureau Act, ch. 73, 37 Stat. 79 (1912) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1991)).
19. PASCHAL, supra note 3, at 64.
20. Id. at 56.
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President has extra-constitutional functions in foreign affairs
became the supreme law of the land many years later when he
wrote a well-received and enduring landmark opinion in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp." Curtiss-Wright clearly
indicates that Sutherland was not wedded to the Constitution
as written.
Sutherland vigorously opposed the federal income tax on
constitutional and philosophical grounds, and his leadership in
the Senate on that issue endeared him to President Taft. He
became a nationally known public figure. Nevertheless,
Sutherland was not re-elected to the Senate for a third term.
Following his electoral defeat, he practiced law in Washington
D.C. His influence and leadership as a public figure continued
unabated. After only one year of membership in the American
Bar Association, he was elected its president.
Sutherland devised a successful strategy that helped Warren
G. Harding become President of the United States. In 1921,
Harding appointed him chairman of the Advisory Committee to
the American Delegation to the Washington Conference on the
Limitation of Armaments. He performed other official duties at
Harding's request. At this stage of his distinguished career,
nearly everyone recognized that Sutherland was a brilliant
jurist, politically savvy, scholarly, well-connected and well
liked. Sutherland, at age sixty, became Harding's nominee for
the Supreme Court on September 5, 1922. There were no calls
for confirmation hearings or Senate debates. His nomination
was immediately approved by acclamation. Newspaper
editorialists regarded him as "'eminently fit."'22 By the time he
retired in 1938, he had written over 350 opinions.
One of Sutherland's best opinions for the Court is Powell v.
Alabama.' The Court overturned the rape convictions of three
young black men who were found guilty of raping white girls
(then a capital offense in Alabama). Sutherland pointed out
that the black men were not "afforded a fair opportunity to
21. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (outlining the extra constitutional powers of the President
in foreign relations); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (support-
ing the President's power to enter into executive agreements).
22. PASCHAL, supra note 3, at 114.
23. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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secure counsel of [their] own choice."24 He concluded that
Alabama's criminal justice system denied them due process of
law because "[t]o hold otherwise would be to ignore the funda-
mental postulate. . . 'that there are certain immutable princi-
ples of justice which inhere in the very idea of free govern-
ment .... ,,2' To buttress his opinion, Sutherland cited his in-
tellectual role model, Thomas Cooley, who had written, "'[w]ith
us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, that the
prisoner shall be allowed a defense by counsel.'"26 Powell v.
Alabama discloses that Sutherland's spectrum of individualistic
values was not narrowly economic in nature.
Sutherland was a stickler for procedural due process, a trait
that often irked the New Deal supporters of reform-minded
administrative agencies. In Jones v. SEC2 1 the Court nullified
a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the Securities and
Exchange Commission engaged in a fishing expedition.
Sutherland's opinion refers inter alia to immunities honored by
Parliament and the common law since 1640. He compared the
Commission's "odious" investigation with the "intolerable abuses
of the Star Chamber."28 His eloquent opinion contains won-
derful language that strikes the intellect and appeals to the
heart. Quoting Justice Bradley, he wrote, "'[i]t is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and [guard] against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their
motto should be obsta principiis'"29 (i.e., withstand beginnings).
He added that "[elven the shortest step in the direction of cur-
tailing one of these rights [of individuals] must be halted in
limine, lest it serve as a precedent for further advances in the
same direction, or for wrongful invasions of the others."0
Sutherland's rhetoric was too excessive for Justice Cardozo, who
dissented. The Court's opinion, in Cardozo's words, was flawed
by "denunciatory fervor," and "hyperbole."3' Sutherland, howev-
24. Id. at 53.
25. Id. at 71 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
26. Id. at 70 (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 700 (8th
ed. 1927)).
27. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
28. Id. at 28.
29. Id. at 24 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id. at 33 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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er, recognized prophetically what has occurred in recent years,
namely the steady chipping away of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments' underlying principles and guarantees.
Sutherland's masterful opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty2
is admired by liberals33 and viewed as "unfortunate" by many
conservatives.34 Many scholars are puzzled by Sutherland's
unexpected deference to the local legislature's judgment.
Sutherland, however, noticed a conceptual link between the
zoning ordinance under consideration and the common law of
nuisance. Accordingly, he deferred to the legislative judgment
that some land uses, depending on their location, could become
nuisances that violate the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas.35 Euclid demonstrates that Sutherland's premises en-
abled him to act at times not as the foe of progress but as its
proponent.
II. OBSTINANCY AND FAILURE
In cases involving economic liberties, Sutherland often aban-
doned the canons of judicial restraint. Arkes claims that "liber-
als and conservatives recoil from the jurisprudence of
Sutherland [because they] [bloth fear the claims of moral
truth.""6 Arkes's feisty presentation of this claim betrays his
own entrenched metaphysical beliefs. Arkes apparently fails to
appreciate that it is possible to believe in enduring moral
truths and still recoil from Sutherland's jurisprudential pref-
erence for a censorious judiciary.
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. Professor Michael Allan Wolf and many other experts on land use credit
Sutherland for writing a superb opinion that requires judges to give state and local
officials due deference when causes of action are brought by individuals who chal-
lenge the facial validity of land use and environmental restrictions. See Michael Allan
Wolf, George Sutherland, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIcTIo-
NARY 449 (1994) (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994), see also Michael Allan Wolf, The Pre-
science and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 252
(Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
34. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Bookshelf- The Father of Natural Rights, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 5, 1995, at A12.
35. Wolf, George Sutherland, supra note 33, at 450.
36. AEKES, supra note 1, at 284.
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Sutherland believed that, at times, the Constitution may be
cast aside "as a parchment without significance."37 He saw ap-
plicable principles of law "behind the form and structure of the
Constitution." 8 In addition to the Constitution itself and his
oath to support it, he was constrained only by "his own consci-
entious and informed convictions."39 To discover the sources of
his informed convictions, one must turn again to his early expe-
riences in life, his education, and his political career.
"Laissez-faire ideology was an important part of the religious
individualism and self-determination that [had] developed in
America"' when Sutherland was an impressionable youth.
During that period of his life, many educators and opinion
leaders believed that cooperative ventures between individuals
are better left to private ordering than to public control. Ideals
of economic liberty meshed well with the average Utah citizen's
enduring distrust of political power.
After graduating from Brigham Young University, Sutherland
was receptive to the paradigm of constitutional law taught by
the constitutional law professors at the University of Michigan
Law School. Professors James V. Campbell and Thomas M.
Cooley "suffered no epistemological doubts when they made the
rudimentary point that the purpose of the Constitution was to
protect its citizens from the 'arbitrary' uses of political pow-
er."4' Both jurists believed "that it was possible to make dis-
tinctions between the 'arbitrary' and the 'plausible' uses of leg-
islation." 2 An essential element in Cooley's constellation of
thought was the idea that property is "sacredly protected by the
Constitution."' Sutherland never concealed his intellectual
debt to this influential jurist.
37. Id. at 286.
38. Id. at 287.
39. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting).
40. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 at 74
(1991). Free trade principles, of course, were also influential in Scotland, the land of
Sutherland's father's birth. The tradition of Scottish Realism, which includes Adam
Smith and many other political economists during the Scottish Enlightenment, influ-
enced generations of American intellectuals and jurists. See id. at 76.
41. ARKES, supra note 1, at 43.
42. Id.
43. HOVENKAMP, supra note 40, at 69 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State
Control of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REV. (SER.4) 233, 271 (1878)).
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Cooley's treatise "probably contributed more to substantive
due process doctrine than any other volume."45 But substantive
due process is an indeterminate notion. How does a judge de-
termine its scope? Cooley relied on state court cases to find the
governing principles of fundamental fairness. His treatise and
articles taught Sutherland to see the important relationships
between constitutional law and the "grand old common law."
46
According to Cooley, common law principles can be used as
trump cards to invalidate legislation.4' Cooley's theory seems
to disregard the usual assumption that statutes supersede case
rulings. His inversion can be justified, however, if the reasoned
case rulings of the common law enable judges to see principles
of fundamental fairness beyond the words, form, and structure
of the Constitution. Sutherland was persuaded by Cooley's reli-
ance upon the common law's authority and its usefulness as a
source of norms that protect the rights of individuals.
By the time Sutherland became involved in politics, scholarly
jurists, like Christopher Tiedeman and Francis Wharton," had
long stressed the need for a Supreme Court that actively re-
strained the other departments of government. As the nine-
teenth century drew to a close, there was a growing faniiliarity
with various versions of Marxism,49 and state legislatures were
responding to voters who wanted to regulate business enterpris-
es that were not advancing the common good. In response,
44. THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
The treatise "is generally recognized as the single most influential work in constitu-
tional law in the latter part of the nineteenth century." PAuL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY
AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 73 (1992).
Cooley tried to "produce a unified, systematic set of principles that are the true basis
of constitutional order." Id.
45. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J.
2304, 2320 (1995) (Book Review).
46. KAHN, supra note 44, at 74 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Con-
trol of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REV. (SER.4) 233, 247 (1878)).
47. Professor Barnett has helpfully described the relationships between judge-
made common law, judge-made constitutional law, and legislation. See Randy E.
Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 117 (1995).
48. See FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW (1884). Wharton's "work con-
tained the most explicit argument in the 1880's legal literature that the Fourteenth
Amendment should be used to protect a general, substantive liberty of contract."
HOVENKAMP, supra note 40, at 95.
49. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 98 (1944).
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Tiedeman wrote Limitations of the Police Power to "protect
private rights against the radical experimentations of social
reformers."" In his book urging courts to protect freedom,
Tiedeman openly expressed his fears of socialism and commu-
nism. Others did the same. When Joseph H. Choate argued
that an income tax was unconstitutional, he appealed to the
Court's "reason" by arguing (hysterically): 'The act of Congress
which we are impugning before you is communistic in its pur-
poses and tendencies, and is defended here upon [communistic
and socialist] principles .... [We submit that all patriotic
Americans must pray that our views shall prevail."5 His
prayer for relief was granted. Subsequently, the Court's income
tax decision (praised by Sutherland) was superseded by a duly
ratified amendment to the Constitution.52
Social Darwinism was popularized by many defenders of
capitalism and individualism. Social Darwinism was based
loosely on a "survival of the fittest" thesis first espoused by
Herbert Spencer as early as 1850-before Darwin published his
theory of evolution in 1859."' Tiedeman was one of many dis-
tinguished popularizers of Spencer's pseudo-scientific doctrine.
Perhaps even Cooley was a Spencerian.' In any event, by the
time Sutherland became a judge, many of his friends and col-
leagues believed that government-sponsored regulatory and
welfare schemes merely delay the inevitable and salutary de-
mise of the weak members of the human species. It is unclear
whether Sutherland ever embraced this amoral creed.55
It is clear that in the last two decades of his life,
Sutherland's conscientious convictions about the government's
limited role in the economy remained intact. Indeed, during the
Great Depression, he stubbornly dug in his heels and allowed
the legislatures little or no leeway when they enacted laws to
50. Thomas C. Grey, Introduction to CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES at iii (Roy M. Mersky & Myron Jacobson eds.,
1974) (1890).
51. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 532-553, modified on
reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The decision, invalidating the federal income tax, accord-
ing to Sutherland, corrected "a century of error."
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
53. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1928).
54. PASCHAL, supra note 3, at 9.
55. HOVENKAMP, supra note 40, at 2324, 2324 n.82.
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ameliorate the consequences of a malfunctioning economy. As a
result, he impeded the implementation of the New Deal and,
partly because of President Roosevelt's sardonic critique,
Sutherland became an object of ridicule in some quarters.
In retrospect, it is apparent that Sutherland's jurisprudence
contains at least four related flaws:
First, Sutherland relied too heavily on backward-looking
common law concepts. For example, he believed that the gov-
ernment was only permitted to regulate businesses devoted to
the public interest.56 This notion was championed by Cooley
who manipulatively used venerable common law maxims to
limit the legislature's power. The doctrine that only a few busi-
nesses were devoted to the public interest was perhaps useful
during the early days of the industrial revolution, but it was
clearly anachronistic by the 1930s. Indeed, the common law
often moves too incrementally to cope with the complexities of a
rapidly changing economy. Unlike Sutherland, the modern
Court realizes correctly that no commercial enterprise open to
the public is per se immune from duly enacted laws that re-
strict economic liberty in order to improve the common weal.
Second, Sutherland relied excessively on the law's artificial
reasoning often ignoring the legislature's findings that indicate
a real and substantial nexus between means (laws) and ends
(permissible legislative objectives). He thereby disregarded
Aristotle's common sense caveat: Do not allow formal logic to
tempt you to deny experience.57
Third, Sutherland mistakenly believed that his effort to pre-
serve the economic status quo was neutral in character. Howev-
er, the very act of choosing the status quo as an appropriate
baseline often unfairly disfavors groups already disadvantaged
by existing laws. For example, in cases involving the regulation
56. For cases holding that certain types of businesses are immune from state reg-
ulation, since they are not devoted to the public interest, see, e.g., New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S. 235 (1929);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927). The English common law origin of this concept is discussed in Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113 (1876).
57. See THE OXFORD HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 33 (Anthony Kenny ed.,
1994).
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of prices and wages, Sutherland deemed invalid any redistribu-
tion of power incompatible with judge-made precepts that creat-
ed unfair distributions of power and wealth. Sutherland's oppo-
sition to economic reforms maintained many existing unfair
inequalities. He opposed many reforms on the basis of the four
classical liberal assertions referred to earlier in this essay.58
These assertions are politically controversial. Therefore,
Sutherland's approach was hardly neutral unless the word
"neutral" is used naively or fecklessly.
As a result of these three related flaws, Sutherland's juris-
prudence contains a fourth defect. He thought that he was
interpreting the Constitution as a judge should when, in many
cases, he was actually making policy judgments legislative in
character. Moreover, he became increasingly dogmatic, disingen-
uous, and result-oriented. A line of cases commencing with
Adkins v. Children's Hospital,59 decided in 1923, illustrates his
hubris and obstinacy.
The Court held in Adkins that a legislatively mandated mini-
mum wage for women unconstitutionally abridges liberty of
contract. Sutherland's opinion seemed plausible to many jurists
in 1923. He pointed out accurately that "the [minimum wage
act's] declared basis ... is not the value of the services ren-
dered but the extraneous circumstances that the employee
needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsis-
tence."" Such legislation, in Sutherland's opinion, is akin to
taking money from A and giving it to B, even when A's conduct
is not a cause of B's indigence. Therefore, Sutherland concluded
that the minimum wage law challenged in Adkins violates a
moral requirement that obligates legislatures not to force em-
ployers to pay wages greater than the value of the services ren-
dered by their employees.6 ' Whence came this moral require-
ment? Arkes would have us believe that Sutherland derived it
from an eternal moral truth.
To comply with this posited extra-constitutional moral re-
quirement, the New York legislature enacted a minimum wage
58. See supra part I.
59. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
60. Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 559.
826 [Vol. 30:815
A REVIEW ESSAY
law that required administratively prescribed minimum wages,
in various categories of business, to be "fairly and reasonably
commensurate with the value of the service or class of service
rendered."62 Despite New York's compliance with the moral
requirement insisted upon by Sutherland, the Court in
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo' deemed unconstitution-
al the State's minimum wage law. Chief Justice Hughes's caus-
tic dissent observed that there was "nothing in the Federal
Constitution which denies to the state the power to protect
women from being exploited by overreaching employers through
the refusal of a fair wage as defined in the New York stat-
ute. . . ."" Justice Stone's dissent noted "the grim irony is
[that the Court is] speaking of the freedom of contract of [em-
ployees], who, because of their economic necessities, give their
services for less than is needful to keep body and soul togeth-
er."
65
In Morehead, Justice Sutherland joined the Court's uncon-
vincing opinion which did not discuss forthrightly New York's
apparent compliance with the moral requirement Sutherland
engrafted in the Constitution. Professor Arkes unfortunately
does not discuss this case, perhaps because Sutherland's concur-
rence indicates that he disingenuously avoided the implications
of his prior position in Adkins.
Sutherland imprudently underestimated the furor that imme-
diately ensued after Morehead was announced. The Republican
National Convention disavowed the decision, and the party's
platform pledged that the Republican candidate for the presi-
dency would support state minimum wage laws that protect
women.66  Sutherland, however, refused to adapt to the
changed political climate; he continued to be "deluded by the
notion that the welfare state could be judicially throttled and
the brave old world of [his] youth restored." 7
62. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 605 (1936) (citing Sec-
tion 551(8) of New York's minimum wage law).
63. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
64. Id. at 619 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 632 (Stone, J., dissenting).
66. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 173-74 (1941).
67. ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 167 (1960).
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Adkins and Morehead were overruled in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish," when the Court finally rejected a challenge to a
minimum wage law. Sutherland's impassioned dissent quotes
words penned by the professors who taught at the law school
he attended. Relying on Professor Campbell, Sutherland wrote
that the Constitution cannot be changed when "'unforeseen
emergencies" occur.69 Quoting Cooley, Sutherland added that
"'much of the benefit expected from written Constitutions would
be lost if their provisions were to be bent to circumstances or
modified by public opinion.' 70
Professor Arkes, who is extremely critical of the Court's opin-
ion in West Coast Hotel Co., claims that the majority opinion
never adequately answered Sutherland's dissent. 1 Perhaps
Arkes has a point; on the other hand, the Court and
Sutherland did not share the same first principles concerning
individualism, the common good or equal justice under law.
Indeed, the Court's opinion presupposes that a legislature may
protect women employees exploited by owners of sweat shops.
Moreover, the Court selected as applicable a moral requirement
quite different from the one announced in Adkins by
Sutherland. According to the Court, "[tihe [charitible and tax-
paying community] is not bound to provide what is in effect a
subsidy for unconscionable employers."72
Whether minimum wage laws are unwise is a controversial
political question that depends, in large part, on a legislature's
finding of relevant facts. For example, will a mandatory mini-
mum wage harm small businesses? Will it increase unemploy-
ment? Will it cause disproportionate harm to laid off persons of
color? Will it have inflationary effects on prices? Will it redis-
tribute income in ways that do not benefit the low income
group for whose benefit it is intended? Or will a minimum
wage law increase purchasing power and help the neediest
among the employed? Will it be an incentive for persons to end
68. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
69. Id. at 403 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting People ex rel. Twitchell v.
Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 139 (1865)).
70. Id. at 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMrATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927)).
71. ARKES, supra note 1, at 141-42.
72. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 399.
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their dependency on welfare? The answers to these questions of
legislative fact and many other relevant factual questions are
not dictated by transcendent natural law or immutable moral
truth. A minimum wage law, therefore, should not be deemed
unconstitutional if the legislature has made a reasoned judg-
ment based on the evidence simply because judges who oppose
the policy option have made a different and perhaps more en-
lightened judgment.
The abandonment of Sutherland's expansive notion of judicial
review in economic liberty cases has resulted in some excessive-
ly high costs to businesses, some self-defeating laws, and the
proliferation of several administrative agencies running amok.
Sutherland's shade will say, "I told you so" when he observes
our ailing regulatory/welfare state, which needs a major over-
haul. The appropriate forum to argue the need for deregulation,
however, is no longer the Court, pace Cooley, Sutherland, and
Arkes. Therefore, despite the resurgent interest in natural law,
Professor Arkes's apologia is unlikely to restore the good name
of Sutherland whose dogmatic adherence to libertarian nos-
trums placed the Supreme Court in serious jeopardy in 1937
when Roosevelt threatened to "pack" the Court. In 1938, the
nation, by and large, breathed a huge sigh of relief when
George Sutherland retired.
HI. CRITIQUE OF ARKES'S APPROACH
Professor Arkes believes that the United States Constitution
is morally perfectible and he encourages the Justices of the Su-
preme Court to act as our nation's moral guardians. Arkes's
beliefs in immutable moral truths that are discernible by judges
are dangerous-as is unwittingly demonstrated by his study of
George Sutherland's record of obstructionism. And Arkes's advo-
cacy of judicial activism is incompatible with the allocation of
powers specified in the Constitution. For example, the Constitu-
tion permits the enactment of immoral laws, so long as the
legislation is within the ambit of the legislature's powers and is
not prohibited explicitly or implicitly by the text of the Consti-
tution. To argue, as Arkes does, that every immoral law, which
abridges someone's economic liberty, is unconstitutional is to
argue for an imperial judiciary.
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Throughout his biography of Sutherland, Arkes fails to ac-
knowledge that judges lack the perfect moral compass demand-
ed by his call for unbridled judicial activism. For example, a
law that increases the minimum wage can be either defended
or attacked on moral grounds. But surely, the average judge is
not better qualified than the average citizen to make the right
moral judgment.
Recognizing their intellectual limitations, the Justices of the
Supreme Court have properly limited the Court's power in
many respects. For example, doctrines like standing to sue,
abstention doctrines, the political question doctrine, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality (except in exceptional situations)
and the doctrine of separation of powers limit the judiciary's
capacity to interfere with the give and take of politics. Arkes,
however, wants judges to be oracles of truth even though
Sutherland, his role model, was more often reactionary than
right.
My critique of Arkes's jurisprudence is this: it is one thing to
believe in immutable truths, it is quite another to trust the
moral compass of unelected judges. Arkes is much too trusting,
and this is the embarrassing non sequitur of his absurd thesis.
On the one hand, he criticizes the Court, and on the other he
wants it to grasp more power.
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